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FOLLOWING ORDERS: CAMPBELL V. UNITED STATES,
THE WAIVER OF APPELLATE RIGHTS, AND THE DUTY
OF COUNSEL
Jacob Szewczyk+
“Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by
counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other
rights he may have.”1
On April 23, 2008, the state charged Robert Campbell with participating in a
mortgage fraud conspiracy.2 Campbell pleaded guilty in return for a favorable
plea agreement.3 As part of the agreement, he waived his right to appeal his
conviction.4 On September 20, 2010, pursuant to his plea agreement, Campbell
was sentenced.5 After sentencing, Campbell changed his mind and asked his
attorney to file an appeal, but “[n]o notice of appeal was filed.”6
Less than two months later, Campbell asked the court “to vacate, set aside, or
correct [his] sentence,” premised on Campbell’s attorney’s failure to file a notice
of appeal, which Campbell alleged he had ordered his attorney to do.7 The
district court dismissed “all . . . of Campbell’s claims.”8 Subsequently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed to hear Campbell’s
appeal on one issue: “whether Campbell was denied effective assistance of
+
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2010, George Mason University. The author would like to thank Professor Cara Drinan for her
expertise and hours of assistance and guidance that allowed him to write this Comment. In addition,
the author would like to thank his parents, William and Christine Szewczyk, as well as his siblings
and the rest of his family, for their endless support. The author would like to thank his fiancée,
Christina Lee, for her love, support, edits, and suggestions for this Comment. Last, but not least,
the author would like to thank the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their
outstanding and tireless work on this, and every, article.
1. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
2. Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 2008). Campbell’s participation
in the fraud consisted of “falsifying mortgage documents, covertly paying borrowers’ closing costs,
and ‘flip[ping]’ properties bought by a straw purchaser and resold to Campbell at an inflated price.”
Id. (alteration in original).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 356.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 355–56. Campbell’s motion to vacate was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id.
at 356. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the federal habeas corpus statute that allows a federal prisoner to
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction, sentence, or any other collateral attack. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
8. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 356.
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counsel when his attorney failed to file a requested notice of appeal.”9 The court,
ultimately, answered in the affirmative, joining the majority of its sister
circuits.10
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the concept of ineffective
assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.11 In Strickland, the Court
established a two-pronged test to determine whether an attorney provided
deficient representation to his client during trial.12 Under the Court’s twopronged test, “[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.”13
Since the Strickland decision, the Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
the ineffective assistance of counsel test to encompass a variety of factual
scenarios.14 Whether counsel’s failure to file a requested appeal, after a
defendant has waived his right to appeal through a plea bargain, constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel remains unanswered by the Supreme Court.
Because of this open question, a circuit split has developed with the majority of
circuits holding that under such circumstances there is a valid ineffective

9. Id.
10. Id. at 360; see Tamar Kaplan-Marans, An Appealing Split: Filing an Appeal After a Plea
Bargain: Is Counsel Obliged to File a Meritless Appeal?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1183, 1184–85
(2009) (“Even though a defendant’s waiver renders an appeal futile and therefore frivolous, counsel
is still required to file one under the Sixth Amendment.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v.
Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir.
2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States,
442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 794 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005))).
11. 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984).
12. See id. (discussing the test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
13. Id. at 687; see also id. at 686–91 (providing the reasoning behind the test as well as the
requirements for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
14. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (holding that “defense counsel
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and
conditions that may be favorable to the accused”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012)
(determining that, to meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of ineffective
assistance of counsel resulting in the rejection of a plea-bargain, “a defendant must show that but
for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have
been presented to the court [,] . . . that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed”); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478
(2010) (holding that defense counsel has an obligation to inform a defendant of potential
immigration-related consequences of a guilty plea); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 474 (2000)
(addressing a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file
a notice of appeal).
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assistance of counsel claim, regardless of whether or not the defendant has
waived his right to appeal.15 This Comment will address the circuit split.
This Comment begins with the background and an analysis of Strickland and
the expansion of the Strickland test. Next, it analyzes the circuit courts’ split
opinions.16 This Comment argues that the majority approach is in accord with
Supreme Court precedent and is the most effective approach for protecting the
rights of defendants in criminal cases. Finally, this Comment advocates that
courts should adopt the Tenth Circuit’s test in United States v. Garrett to balance
the essential constitutional rights of criminal defendants with the need for
judicial efficiency.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A TOUGH ROAD FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence [sic].”17 The right to the assistance of counsel is so essential that it
justifies “withhold[ing] from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.”18 In the seminal
1963 case, Gideon v. Wainwright,19 the Supreme Court deemed the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel so fundamental that it held that
the right applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.20 Since

15. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 266; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266;
Watson, 493 F.3d at 963–64; Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771–72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790;
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1198; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1267.
16. See e.g., United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (footnote omitted). If not afforded the
assistance of counsel, the accused would face a substantial risk of conviction based solely on the
fact that he lacks the education needed to prove his innocence. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 69 (1932). The essentiality of the assistance of counsel was addressed again in Cronic, where
the court stated:
An accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our
criminal justice system. Lawyers in criminal cases “are necessities, not luxuries.” Their
presence is essential because they are the means through which the other rights of the
person on trial are secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be “of little
avail,” as this Court has recognized repeatedly. “Of all the rights that an accused person
has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have.”
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1984) (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307–08 (1973); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Powell,
287 U.S. at 69).
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Id. at 341–45; see also Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v.
Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181, 288–89 (2003) (discussing the important contributions to
criminal defendants’ rights made by the decision in Gideon).
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Gideon, the Court has repeatedly expanded the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of the right to assistance of counsel.21
A. When Has Counsel Failed His Duty?
The Constitution requires more than the appointment of counsel.22 In 1970,
the Supreme Court, in McMann v. Richardson,23 stated that criminal “defendants
. . . are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”24 The Court
developed the meaning of efficacy in its Strickland line of cases.
In Strickland, the Court established the standard for determining whether a
defendant’s sentence may be overturned because of ineffective assistance of
counsel.25 The defendant in Strickland, David Washington, turned himself in
after a ten-day crime spree that left three people dead.26 The defendant
confessed in detail to the third homicide and was subsequently indicted for
kidnapping and murder.27 An experienced attorney was appointed to represent
the defendant, but the attorney felt the case was hopeless, because, “against [the
attorney’s] specific advice, [Washington] . . . confessed to the first two
murders.”28 Ultimately, the defendant pleaded guilty to three homicide charges
and a kidnapping charge.29
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, Washington’s attorney neither sought
out character witnesses other than Washington’s wife and mother, nor did he
prepare any evidence regarding Washington’s mental or emotional state.30

21. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment dictates
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies to juvenile proceedings); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (determining that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the
state to provide counsel to an indigent defendant who has an appeal as of right).
22. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[D]efendants facing felony
charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.”).
23. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
24. Id. at 771 (emphasis added). According to the American Bar Association (ABA), the duty
of defense counsel “is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and devotion
and to render effective, quality representation.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 4-1.2, at 120 (3d ed. 1993). See also Bruce Andrew
Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1053, 1057–58 (1980) (discussing the Court’s holding that “recognized that the [S]ixth
[A]mendment ‘right to the effective assistance of counsel’ precludes not only impediments to
counsel’s performance imposed by a state or court, but also an inadequate performance by counsel
unimpaired by state action”).
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 671 (1984).
26. Id. at 671–72.
27. Id. at 672.
28. Id. In addition to ignoring this advice, Washington also “waived his right to a jury.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 672–73. According to the Court, the decision not to pursue these avenues “reflected
trial counsel’s sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of [Washington’s]
confessions.” Id. at 673.
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Following the defense attorney’s arguments, the judge sentenced the defendant
to death.31
Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court upholding Washington’s
convictions, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court alleging that he had
received “ineffective assistance of counsel.”32 After the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit granted partial relief, the State of Florida filed for, and was
granted, a writ of certiorari.33
Specifically, the Court “granted certiorari to consider the standards by which
to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be
overturned because of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel.”34 The Court,
in recognizing the important role of defense counsel in criminal proceedings,
created a two-prong test to analyze ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1)
“the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2)
“the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.”35
The first prong requires a showing that counsel’s performance was so severely
“deficient” that the defendant did not receive the “‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”36 This requires a determination of
whether, under the circumstances, the counsel’s conduct was reasonable.37
Further, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel
provided adequate assistance.38
Conduct rising to the level of deficient performance includes failing to
investigate and present mitigating factors in a sentencing proceeding,39 as well
as “failing to examine court files on [a client’s] prior conviction.”40 Conversely,
an attorney’s conduct does not rise to the level of deficient performance when
31. Id. at 674–75. The judge found multiple aggravating circumstances to justify the death
sentence. Id. at 674.
32. Id. at 678.
33. See id. at 683 (discussing the cases prior history).
34. Id. at 684.
35. Id. at 687.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 688. In Strickland and subsequent cases, the Court stated that it uses American Bar
Association (ABA) standards to determine what constitutes reasonable performance. See, e.g.,
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“We long have recognized that ‘[p]revailing
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable . . . .’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)).
38. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all circumstances, applying a heavy
measure of deference to counsel’s judgment.” (emphasis added)).
39. See Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)) (“Counsel thus failed to uncover and present any evidence of Porter’s
mental health or mental impairment, his family background, or his military service. The decision
not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.”).
40. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (“[T]he lawyers were deficient in failing
to examine the court file on [the client’s] prior conviction.”).
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an attorney advises his client to withdraw his insanity defense, because the Court
is highly deferential to trial counsel’s strategic choices.41
But, the
reasonableness of the attorney’s conduct is only one part of the Court’s analysis.
The second prong requires the defendant to show that counsel’s “deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.”42 To fulfill the second prong, the
defendant must prove that, but-for the attorney’s poor performance, “the
factfinder [sic] would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”43 For
example, prejudice exists when counsel fails to examine prior court documents
that contained mitigating evidence,44 but not when counsel fails to provide
mitigating evidence that was mostly duplicative.45 The Court does not often
make a determination on prejudice, and will typically remand the case to the
lower court to make such a determination.46
B. Expansion of the Strickland Test
Since creating the rigid Strickland test, the Supreme Court has heard a variety
of ineffective assistance of counsel cases.47 This analysis will focus on cases
that apply the Strickland test in the plea context.

41. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009) (holding that counsel did
not provide deficient performance by recommending that the client withdraw a defense that he
would be unable to establish). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (stating that reviewing courts
must give deference to counsel’s strategy and method of conducting the trial).
42. Id. at 687.
43. Id. at 695.
44. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390 (“If the defense lawyers had looked in the file on Rompilla’s
prior conviction, it is uncontested they would have found a range of mitigation leads that no other
source had opened up.”).
45. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1409 (2011) (explaining that “[t]here is
no reasonable probability that the additional evidence Pinholster presented in his state habeas
proceedings would have changed the jury’s verdict”). Another example of a lack of prejudice is
when counsel failed to provide his own expert witness but was able to extract the same testimony
from the state’s expert. See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791–92 (2011) (explaining
that an independent expert witness for defense would not have provided any addition benefit to the
defendant’s case other than a “theoretical possibility” that the crime was committed by a separate
party).
46. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1487 (2010) (remanding the case to the
state court for a determination of the prejudice prong); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 390
(1986) (stating that an evidentiary hearing was required to determine if defendant was prejudiced,
and deferring that determination to the lower courts).
47. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollom, 130 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2009) (addressing defense counsel’s
failure to perform a thorough investigation for mitigating evidence); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 164 (2002) (allegation that attorney had a conflict of interests at trial); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 447 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1986) (failure to file a motion to suppress evidence allegedly
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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1. Ineffective Assistance in the Plea Process
The first extension of Strickland to the plea process occurred in 1985 in the
case of Hill v. Lockhart.48 In Hill, the defendant alleged he was provided
ineffective assistance of counsel because he pleaded guilty based on erroneous
advice regarding his parole eligibility under the plea.49 For the deficient
performance prong, the Court reasoned that a plea must be voluntary, therefore,
a defendant must receive competent advice from his attorney regarding his
plea.50
Applying the Strickland test’s “prejudice” prong to the plea process, the Hill
Court determined that “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the
defendant must show that there [was] a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.”51 In Hill, the Court only addressed the standards of attorney
conduct prior to a plea being entered. However, in a 2000 case, Roe v. FloresOrtega,52 the Court addressed the application of the Strickland test to plea
agreements that had already been accepted.53
2. Failing to File a Notice of Appeal After a Plea Agreement Is Reached
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the question presented was whether a valid claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel existed when an attorney failed to file a notice
of appeal as requested by the defendant after a plea agreement was reached.54

48. 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In a later case, the Court explicitly stated the importance of plea
agreements: “plea bargains have become . . . central to the administration of the criminal justice
system.” See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); see also 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 180 (4th ed. 2008) (“In a typical
year roughly 85% of the federal criminal cases filed end in a guilty plea. Because defendants often
have little to gain by simply admitting guilt to the charges as filed, and because there are far more
cases filed than could possibly be resolved by a full-blown trial, prosecutors routinely offer
inducements to a defendant to plead guilty.”).
49. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53 (“[The defendant] sought federal habeas relief on the ground that his
court-appointed attorney had failed to advise him that, as a second offender, he was required to
serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.”).
50. Id. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
51. Id. at 59; see also Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The
Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 549 (1988)
(stating that Hill created a new, difficult rule to win an ineffective assistance of counsel case
regarding the plea process). Richard Klein further explained that the “[j]ustification for tolerating
plea bargaining relies on the assumption that a knowledgeable defendant with the advice of
competent counsel rationally compares the punishment he would receive if he pleads guilty with
that he would be likely to receive if convicted.” Id.
52. 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
53. Id. at 473 (“In this case we must decide the proper framework for evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal without
respondent’s consent.”).
54. Id.
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The defendant in Flores-Ortega had pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.55
Despite his attorney making a note to herself about preparing appellate
documents, no notice of appeal was ever filed.56
Upon review, the Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel could be
established “when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a
defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.”57 The Court
recognized the long-standing rule that disregarding a defendant’s instructions to
file a notice of appeal is “professionally unreasonable” conduct because the
defendant “reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice.”58
Additionally, because filing a notice of appeal is a “ministerial task,” the “failure
to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes,”59 and it cannot be justified
as a “strategic decision.”60
For the prejudice prong, the Court, in Flores-Ortega, introduced a new
exception to the presumption that counsel has provided effective assistance.61
Previous exceptions were recognized where the defendant was denied any
assistance of counsel,62 when the assistance of counsel was actually or
constructively denied,63 and when counsel had a conflict of interest.64 FloresOrtega involved the denial of the defendant’s right to a proceeding.65 Denying
the defendant an opportunity to appeal when the defendant wanted to appeal and
had the right to appeal created a presumption of prejudice.66 In such cases, the
Court held, the defendant need only “demonstrate that there is a reasonable

55. Id. at 473.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 484.
58. Id. at 477.
59. Id. On the other hand, “a defendant who explicitly tells his attorney not to file an appeal
plainly cannot later complain that, by following his instructions, his counsel performed deficiently.”
Id. (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)). The Court also stated that defense counsel
is not required to “always consult with the defendant regarding appeals.” Id. at 480. Instead,
“counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when
there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal . . . or (2) that this
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id.
60. Id. at 477.
61. See id. at 484 (“[W]e hold that, to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant
must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to
consult with him about appeal, he would have timely appealed.”).
62. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding “that a trial is unfair if the
accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial”).
63. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 378 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25) (explaining the Court’s exceptions to Strickland’s prejudice
prong).
64. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 345–50 (1980)).
65. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483 (recognizing that the case resulted in the “forfeiture of a
proceeding itself” rather than the usual concern for the reliability of the outcome of a proceeding).
66. Id. at 482.

2015]

Following Orders

497

probability that . . . he would have timely appealed” had it not been for his
lawyer’s “deficient” performance.67
Flores-Ortega, although not explicitly stated by the Court, can be understood
to reaffirm the long-standing proposition that there are certain decisions that
belong to the defendant in a criminal trial, and trial counsel must further, not
inhibit, these decisions. The Court has recognized that the criminal defendant
has the right to waive a jury trial, regardless of counsel’s personal opinion.68
The choice to waive the assistance of counsel also belongs to the defendant,69 as
does the decision to waive a trial all together.70 The decision that counsel
provides ineffective assistance of counsel when he fails to file a requested appeal
is a logical affirmation of the distinction between the rights of defendants and
the obligations of counsel.
3. Collateral Consequences Stemming from Plea Agreements
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky71 addressed whether counsel’s
failure to inform his client about collateral consequences of a plea can constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel.72 In Padilla, the defendant alleged that his
attorney failed to inform him of the potential immigration consequences of his
guilty plea.73 While the Court chose not to make a decision on whether
Strickland applied to all collateral consequences, it determined that deportation
was so critical to a plea that an effective attorney must advise his client of such
consequences.74 The Court held that an attorney’s failure to inform clients about
the effects of a guilty plea on the possibility of deportation was professionally
unreasonable.75
4. Recent Expansion of the Strickland Test’s Applicability in the Plea
Process
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Frye76 that “defense counsel
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea

67. Id. at 484.
68. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1942).
69. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
70. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
71. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
72. Id. at 1481.
73. Id. at 1478 (“Padilla claims that his counsel . . . told him that he ‘did not have to worry
about immigration status since he had been in the country so long.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Padilla,
253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. Id. at 1481–82.
75. See id. at 1486 (“Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on
families living lawfully in this country demand no less.”).
76. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”77 In Frye, the
defendant was charged with driving with a revoked license.78 The prosecutor
sent Frye’s counsel two plea offers, but counsel never communicated the plea
offers to Frye.79 Without a plea bargain in place, Frye pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to three years in prison.80
On review, the Court restated its assertion from Padilla “that ‘the negotiation
of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’”81 Because plea
negotiations are a “critical phase,” the Court found that “defense counsel have
responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must be met to render the
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the
criminal process at critical stages.”82 Thus, failing to communicate a formal plea
offer to a client is deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland
test.83
In Frye, the Court stated that in order to satisfy the prejudice prong, the
defendant must show that there was a high probability that he would have
accepted the plea bargain if his attorney had presented it to him, and that the
offered plea bargain would have resulted in a “more favorable” outcome than
the results of a criminal trial.84 The defendant must also demonstrate a
“reasonable probability” that both the prosecutor and the judge would have
accepted the plea bargain and would have implemented its terms.85 Although
Frye provided a new ground for defendants to prevail under Strickland, it also
created a new difficulty. Judges must now read the minds of the prosecutor and
trial judge, at the time the plea bargain was offered, to determine whether both
parties would have approved and accepted the plea.86
In Lafler v. Cooper,87 the Supreme Court addressed the requirements to prove
prejudice when a defendant rejected a plea bargain based on erroneous “advice

77. Id. at 1408.
78. Id. at 1404. Frye was charged as a felon because he had three previous convictions for
the same crime. Id.
79. Id. No explanation was given in the decision as to why counsel did not provide Frye with
the prosecutor’s offers. Id.
80. Id. at 1404–05.
81. Id. at 1406 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)).
82. Id. at 1407.
83. Id. at 1409.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1410 (“In order to complete a showing of Strickland prejudice . . . [defendant]
must also show that . . . there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court
would have prevented the [plea] offer from being accepted or implemented.”).
86. See id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the majority’s opinion as requiring the
“process of retrospective crystal-ball gazing posing as legal analysis”).
87. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
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of counsel.”88 Anthony Cooper, the defendant, was charged with multiple
felonies.89 Cooper was offered a plea bargain on three separate occasions and,
relying on the advice of counsel, rejected all three.90 At trial, Cooper “was
convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to
360 months’ imprisonment.”91
On review, the Supreme Court did not address the first prong of the Strickland
test because both sides agreed that defense counsel’s advice to reject the plea
bargains was deficient performance.92 The Court’s analysis of the prejudice
prong was dissected into multiple components, which required the defendant to
show:
[1] but for the ineffective advice of counsel there [was] a reasonable
probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court
. . . [2] that the court would have accepted its terms, and [3] that the
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have
been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were
imposed.93
The Court determined that a fair trial does not eliminate the possibility of
prejudice under Strickland because ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea
bargain stage may result in a more severe punishment than would have been
received by accepting the offer.94 While a defendant has no right to be offered
a plea,95 once a plea is offered, the defendant is entitled to the effective assistance
of counsel when determining whether or not to accept the offer.96

88. See id. at 1383 (distinguishing the facts of Frye from the facts at issue in Lafler and noting
“[t]he instant case comes to the Court with the concession that counsel’s advice with respect to the
plea offer fell below the standard of adequate assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment”). In both Frye and Lafler, the Supreme Court “recognize[d] that the choice between
constitutional modes of adjudication matters . . . so a missed opportunity to accept a plea discount
. . . is a constitutionally cognizable injury.” Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our StillUnregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 131, 131 (2012).
89. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383. “[Cooper] was charged . . . with assault with intent to murder,
possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony,
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and for being a habitual offender.” Id.
90. Id. Cooper alleged that he refused to accept the plea offers, because “his attorney
convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder [the victim]
because she had been shot below the waist.” Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1384.
93. Id. at 1385. This wide-range of factors show that “even if unconstitutional representation
led to a defendant losing the prosecutor’s proffered plea bargain, the court on remand has the
discretion to impose the same, more severe sentence as the defendant was given after trial.” Brown,
supra note 88, at 132.
94. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386.
95. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
96. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
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C. Strickland and Appellate Waivers
1. The Majority Approach
The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that defense counsel
provides ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a notice of appeal
when instructed to do so, despite the existence of an appellate waiver.97 The
Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Campbell v. United States98 and the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis in United States v. Garrett99 are demonstrative of the rationale behind
the holding.
In Campbell, Robert Campbell “pleaded guilty . . . [to] conspiracy to commit
wire and mail fraud.”100 As part of his plea bargain, Campbell waived his right
to appeal with several very narrow exceptions.101 In a motion to vacate his
sentence, Campbell alleged that he ordered his counsel to file a notice of appeal,
but his attorney failed to file the notice.102 After reviewing Supreme Court
precedents and the rulings of its sister circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that “even
when a defendant waives all or most of his right to appeal, an attorney who fails
to file an appeal that a criminal defendant explicitly requests has . . . provided
ineffective assistance of counsel.”103 The court determined that Campbell’s
right, as a criminal defendant, to the effective assistance of counsel was not
diminished by his initial acceptance of a plea bargain from the state.104 The
same question was presented in United States v. Garrett.105

97. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tapp,
491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007);
Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d
770, 771–72 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett,
402 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005).
98. 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012).
99. 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005).
100. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355.
101. Id. at 355 & n.1 (stating that Campbell could only appeal “any punishment in excess of
the statutory maximum; . . . any sentence to the extent it exceeds the maximum of the sentencing
range. . . . Nothing . . . shall act as a bar to the defendant perfecting any legal remedies defendant
may otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack respecting claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, voluntariness of this plea and accompanying waivers, or prosecutorial misconduct”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Campbell was not sentenced until two years after his plea, so
that he could sell several properties he owned in order to pay restitution. Telephone Interview with
Thomas Karol, Assistant U.S. Attorney, United States Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 18, 2013).
102. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355–56.
103. Id. at 359–60.
104. Id.
105. 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005).
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In Garrett, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
crack cocaine, and waived his right to appeal with limited exceptions.106 A year
after sentencing, Garrett alleged that he had instructed his counsel to file a notice
of appeal, which his attorney failed to file, and, therefore, Garrett received
ineffective assistance of counsel.107 Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s holding in
Campbell, the Tenth Circuit found that ineffective assistance of counsel could
be established by counsel’s failure to file a requested notice of appeal.108
2. The Minority Approach: A Focus on Judicial Efficiency
The Seventh Circuit addressed whether counsel’s failure to file a requested
appeal, after a defendant waived his right to appeal, was ineffective assistance
of counsel in Nunez v. United States.109 In Nunez, the defendant was “[c]harged
with multiple [drug] offenses.”110 The prosecutor offered the defendant a plea
bargain, which he accepted.111 As part of the plea bargain, the defendant agreed
to waive his right to appeal.112 Nunez challenged his sentence, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, alleging that after sentencing he instructed his attorney to file an appeal,
and that his attorney’s failure to file it constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.113 The court held that the defendant’s counsel did not provide deficient
performance by respecting the terms of the plea agreement, and, therefore, the
defendant could not prevail under the Strickland test.114 Likewise, the Third
Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Mabry.115
In Mabry, James Mabry, the defendant, was charged with multiple felonies.116
Subsequent to impanelling the jury, “Mabry entered into a written plea
agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to . . . possession with intent to
distribute . . . cocaine,” and waived his right to appeal without any exception.117
Eventually, Mabry filed a collateral attack of his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. §
106. Id. The exceptions included any sentence above the statutory maximum and any collateral
challenge based on a change in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1263 n.2.
107. Id. at 1264.
108. Id. at 1266; see also Campbell, 686 F.3d at 359.
109. 546 F.3d 450, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2008).
110. Id. at 453.
111. Id.
112. Id. The waiver only allowed Nunez to appeal if “the sentence exceeded the statutory
maximum or the waiver clause itself should be deemed invalid.” Id.
113. Id. at 451–53.
114. See id. at 456 (“[E]ven if Nunez asked his lawyer to file an appeal, counsel did not
transgress the Constitution by honoring his client’s considered written choice (the waiver) rather
than his client’s oral second thoughts. Nunez’s contention flunks both the conduct and the prejudice
components of ineffective-assistance doctrine.”).
115. 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We, therefore, will part ways with the approach taken
by the majority of courts of appeals. . . . [T]he Nunez opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit presents the proper focus, namely giving effect to the waiver.”).
116. Id. at 233.
117. See id. (describing the conditions of Mabry’s plea agreement with the government).
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2255, arguing that his attorney failed to file an appeal at his instruction.118 As
opposed to the court in Nunez, the Third Circuit did not find that Mabry failed
to meet the requirements of Strickland. Rather, the Third Circuit determined
that the Strickland test, even though it applies to counsel’s failure to file an
appeal, “does not apply when there [was] an appellate waiver.”119
II. STRICKLAND’S APPLICABILITY TO APPELLATE WAIVERS
The development of the applicability of Strickland to the plea process
presented a new question following Flores-Ortega: whether defense counsel
provides ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal
where the defendant has waived his right of appeal pursuant to a plea
agreement.120 The majority of circuits faced with this new question have
answered in the affirmative.121 Only the Nunez and Mabry courts chose not to
follow the majority position.122
A. The Majority-Approach Circuits Properly Focus Their Analysis on
Defendants’ Rights
The majority of the circuits, including the Sixth and Tenth, rely on the logic
of Strickland and Flores-Ortega.123 Despite the fact that Flores-Ortega
involved a defendant who did not waive his right to appeal,124 the majority of
the circuits found the decision applicable to appellate waiver cases, and
supported this position with persuasive reasoning.125 Campbell demonstrates
that the reliance on Flores-Ortega is based on sound logical comparisons and
the similarity of constitutional rights at stake.
In Campbell, the Sixth Circuit determined that Flores-Ortega’s analytical
structure could be applied to Campbell’s facts.126 The Campbell court paid
118. See id. at 235, 239 (stating the procedural history of Mabry’s appeal, as well as the
arguments he put forward in support of his claim).
119. Id. at 241–42, 242 n.14 (discussing the applicability of Strickland to the facts of Mabry).
120. See id. at 241–42 (discussing the courts’ application of Flores-Ortega to appellate
waivers).
121. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
122. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the minority position).
123. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
presumption of prejudice found in Flores-Ortega was applicable to appellate waivers); United
States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining “[t]he Flores-Ortega
framework helps with [the present] case”); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 792 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“The reasoning in Flores-Ortega applies with equal force where, as here, the defendant
has waived many, but not all, of his appellate rights.”).
124. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 488 n.1 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that the government did not “claim . . . that Flores-Ortega waived his
right to appeal as part of his plea agreement”).
125. See supra notes 97 & 123 and accompanying text.
126. Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In light of the specific
propositions of law outlining the obligations of a criminal defense attorney at the appeal stage, and
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particular attention to the time-honored rule “that a lawyer who disregards
specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner
that is professionally unreasonable.”127 Under this rule, “for the purpose of the
Strickland analysis, ‘prejudice must be presumed,’” because the failure to file an
appeal, after the defendant requested the appeal, “[was] a per se violation of the
Sixth Amendment.”128 This “per se” determination eliminates the need to
discuss the Strickland test’s deficient performance prong because the defendant
has already been completely “deprive[d] . . . of any counsel.”129 Therefore, a
complete deprivation equates to absolute prejudice.
The Campbell court further supported its analysis by addressing the appellate
waiver.130 Despite the fact that a defendant “waive[d] [his] right to an appeal by
executing a plea agreement,” the court found that such a waiver was not an
absolute bar to all appeal rights.131 The court further elucidated on instances
where a defendant’s appellate rights cannot be waived under a plea agreement:
(1) when the plea “was not [made] knowing[ly] and voluntarily,” (2) when the
plea did not follow Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, (3) when the plea
“was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel,” (4) “an appeal asserting
that the sentence exceed[ed] the statutory maximum, or [(5)] a challenge
claiming that the sentence was based on constitutionally impermissible criteria
like race.”132
The majority circuits also focused on the duty of defense counsel to his client.
As the Campbell court stated, “[T]here nevertheless are some instances in which
defendants seeking an appeal are still entitled to their day in court. Thus, even
where an appeal appears frivolous, an attorney’s obligations to his or her client
do not end at the moment the guilty plea is entered.”133 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Flores-Ortega recognized as much.134

assuming, as Campbell claims in his brief, that he did direct his attorney to file a notice of appeal,
we conclude that Flores-Ortega largely governs this case.” (footnote omitted)).
127. Id. at 357 (quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accord United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that counsel’s failure
to file a notice of appeal was “professionally unreasonable” according to Flores-Ortega); SandovalLopez, 409 F.3d at 1196 (using the Court’s reasoning in Flores-Ortega to establish that the attorney
acted in a professionally unreasonable manner).
128. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 358 (quoting Ludwig v. United States, 162 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir.
1998)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 358–60.
131. Id. at 358.
132. Id. (quoting United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 471 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Id.
134. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) (“[W]hen counsel’s . . . deficient
performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant
has made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . .”).
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In Garrett, the Tenth Circuit aptly recognized that Flores-Ortega “provided
[a] bright-line rule[] for evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim based on the
performance of an attorney who has consulted with a criminal defendant about
an appeal.”135 As such, under the Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations, the
standard Strickland test is unnecessary because Flores-Ortega established an
analysis specific to when an attorney fails to file a notice of appeal after being
instructed to do so.136
The Tenth Circuit anticipated the argument regarding the potential effect its
holding would have on the efficacy of the criminal justice system, and prudently
provided guidance on maintaining judicial efficiency without placing an
absolute bar to defendants who agreed to appellate waivers as part of their
plea.137 While plea agreements and appellate waivers play a necessary role in
the legal system and often are enforced, it does not mean that a defendant is
completely at the mercy of the court when he is sentenced.138 The Tenth Circuit
implemented an efficient three-pronged test to determine the applicability of a
defendant’s plea agreement appeal waiver.139 The test analyzes “(1) whether the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of [the] defendant’s waiver of appellate
rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate
rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice.”140 If the court determines the plea agreement is enforceable, the court
“will summarily dismiss the appeal without considering its underlying
merits.”141 If the waiver is found to be unenforceable, then the defendant, whose
attorney failed to file an appeal, is entitled to a delayed direct appeal.142 The
courts in Garrett and Campbell did not distinguish Flores-Ortega, even though
the defendant in Flores-Ortega had not waived his right to appeal, while the
defendants in both Garrett and Campbell had.143 Both courts analyzed the
135. United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Flores-Ortega, 528
U.S. at 477–78).
136. See Campbell, 686 F.3d at 358 (analyzing the impact of Flores-Ortega on the Strickland
test); Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265 (reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
counsel’s failure to file notice of appeal, using the Flores-Ortega standard rather than the Strickland
test).
137. See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (discussing the “enforcement test” to determine whether a
plea agreement should be enforced).
138. Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (quoting United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir.
2004)) (“[A] defendant does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the
district court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325).
141. Id. (quoting Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that the
dismissal of an appeal brought subsequent to an enforceable plea agreement appeal waiver
“preserves the benefit of the government’s bargain” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. Id. at 1263.
143. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In light of the
specific propositions of law outlining the obligations of a criminal defense attorney at the appeal
stage . . . we conclude that Flores–Ortega largely governs this case.”); Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265
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constitutional right placed at risk, rather than ignoring the fundamental issue by
relying on the absence of a factually similar case.
B. The Minority Approach Sacrifices Defendants’ Constitutional Rights in the
Name of Public Policy
The Third and Seventh Circuits focused on distinguishing their respective
cases from Flores-Ortega.144 The Seventh Circuit, in Nunez, acknowledged that
the Court in Flores-Ortega stated that “filing a notice of appeal [was] a purely
ministerial task, and the failure to file reflect[ed] inattention to the defendant’s
wishes.”145 However, the Nunez court determined that “[f]iling an appeal [was]
not ‘ministerial’ when the defendant has waived that entitlement.”146 The Nunez
court failed to explain why the waiver made the notice of appeal any less of a
ministerial task than it would be without the waiver.147
Likewise, the Third Circuit, in Mabry, asserted that the Strickland test “d[id]
not apply when there [was] an appellate waiver.”148 As for the courts that have
analogized Flores-Ortega to appellate-waiver cases, the Mabry court rejected
the majority approach, believing that those courts ignore the existence of the
appellate waiver.149 While the Nunez and Mabry courts used the guise of

(using Flores-Ortega to analyze the issue before the court). The court in Campbell recognized that
the defendant in Flores-Ortega did not waive his right to counsel, but the court dispensed with that
factual distinction by determining that the legal theory behind the Flores-Ortega holding was
applicable to the case at bar. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 357–58. In Garrett, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis
made no mention of the fact that Flores-Ortega had not waived his right to appeal. See Garrett,
402 F.3d at 1264–67 (finding that the district court’s focus on the defendants waiver “cannot be
reconciled with the Supreme Court’s holding in Flores-Ortega”).
144. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the minor
exception to Strickland that Flores-Ortega created and the fact that there was no waiver of appellate
rights in Flores-Ortega); United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
Supreme Court in Flores-Ortega did not state whether the same rationale that gave merit to the
argument in Flores-Ortega applied to a case “where the defendant has waived his right to appellate
and collateral review”).
145. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 454 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Ministerial is defined as “[o]f or relating to an act that involves
obedience to instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill,” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added), and an order to file a notice of appeal meets
that definition. However, the Nunez court stated, without any explanation, that the waiver of an
appeal suddenly converts an otherwise ministerial task into a non-ministerial task. See Nunez, 546
F.3d at 454. The plain definition of ministerial, combined with the lack of a cogent explanation in
Nunez, leaves this argument with little merit.
146. Id.
147. Id. (analogizing filing an appeal after waiving the right to appeal to an attorney preparing
for trial after his client has pleaded guilty).
148. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 241.
149. See id. at 242 (stating that the majority courts “fail to address, let alone explain, that there
even [was] a waiver of collateral attack”). But see Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357–
60 (recognizing that Campbell’s plea bargain contained an appellate waiver and discussing why the
Flores-Ortega reasoning applied even when a waiver existed).
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enforcing appellate waivers to refute claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
neither court applied a thorough analysis of the Strickland test in reaching its
decision.150
Although the Seventh Circuit in Nunez agreed partially with the extension of
the holding in Flores-Ortega,151 the court ignored the fundamental constitutional
issue and focused on the fact that Nunez entered the plea knowingly.152 In
addition, the court determined that Nunez’s allegation met neither prong of the
Strickland test.153 As to deficient performance, the court focused on the faulted
premise that adhering to the plea and ignoring the client’s order was objectively
reasonable.154 In applying the prejudice prong, the court illogically determined
that, had an appeal been filed, and despite not knowing the basis for any probable
argument, the court would have dismissed the appeal.155 This ex ante
determination led the court to believe that the failure to file an appeal was not
prejudicial.156
In Mabry, the Third Circuit also chose not to follow the majority approach.157
The court narrowly interpreted Flores-Ortega and relied on the fact that FloresOrtega did not explicitly state the scope of its holding.158 The Mabry court
believed that applying Flores-Ortega to appellate waiver cases “simply does not
‘fit.’”159 The court effectively ignored the actual question presented: whether
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.160 Instead, it focused
on the validity of the waiver, namely, “whether enforcing the waiver . . . would
work a miscarriage of justice.”161 The court justified this approach based on the
idea that “[w]ithout a waiver, the recognition of a defendant’s right to an appeal
150. See Nunez, 546 F.3d at 454–55 (discussing defense counsel’s role in protecting the
benefits that his client received through the plea bargain and, therefore, not providing ineffective
assistance of counsel when not filing a waived appeal); Mabry, 536 F.3d at 240–41 (stating that
waivers of appellate rights are constitutional and that an attempt to appeal when one has waived
said right does not merit the attention that is given to appeals where the defendant has not waived
his right).
151. Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2008) (“There may well be practical
benefits to the other circuits’ extension of [Flores-Ortega], because waivers of appeal are not
airtight.”).
152. See id. at 452 (“In obtaining Nunez’s assent to these terms on the record, the judge stated
that the waiver covers every issue other than the voluntariness of the plea. Asked whether he
understood this, Nunez replied ‘yes.’”).
153. Id. at 456.
154. Id. at 453.
155. Id. at 456. The court also stated that Nunez, based on his layman understanding of the
law, never provided a sufficient ground upon which he would have based his appeal. Id.
156. Id.
157. United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2008).
158. See id. at 240 (discussing the limitations of the Court’s decision in Flores-Ortega).
159. Id. at 241.
160. See id. at 233, 242 (deciding to focus on the “validity of the collateral waiver as a threshold
issue,” prior to the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
161. Id. at 242.
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[was] paramount and counsel’s ineffectiveness clear, for the defendant was
entitled to an appeal.”162 Therefore, under the Third Circuit’s analysis, the right
to appeal is essential to an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.163 The
court also recognized that an appellate waiver made the viability of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim “less than clear,” but the court did not
explicitly hold such a claim would not survive.164
The Nunez court’s justification also relied on contract law principles.165
According to the Seventh Circuit, there is a difference between the reasoning in
Flores-Ortega that “presume[d] that the defendant ha[d] contested the charges”
and a situation where the defendant “plead[ed] guilty [and] also waive[d] [his]
right to appeal.”166 The court reasoned that where the defendant waived his right
to appeal, his attorney has a duty to protect the benefits of the plea bargain, which
trumps any duty to file an appeal.167 The Seventh Circuit was primarily referring
to the government’s leniency that the client may be putting in jeopardy if his
attorney filed the requested notice of appeal.168 However, an analysis of
Supreme Court precedent quickly reveals the faults in the Seventh Circuit’s
reasoning.
Although the Nunez court presented an argument with some merit, the
Supreme Court in Flores-Ortega held that whether or not to appeal (or attempt
to appeal) was ultimately the defendant’s decision.169 Although the Court
admitted that a defendant’s guilty plea was a relevant factor when analyzing a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, such a factor was not determinative.170
The argument that the attorney has the final say when the defendant chooses to
file a notice of appeal is contrary to fundamental Supreme Court precedent that
dictates that such decisions are left to the defendant.171
162. Id. at 244.
163. Id.
164. See id. (emphasis added) (finding the defendant’s appellate waiver enforceable, and,
therefore, declining to analyze the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
165. Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 452–53 (7th Cir. 2008)
166. Id. at 454.
167. See id. at 455. Filing an appeal when the defendant has waived his right to do so may
allow the prosecutor to withdraw the plea bargain. Id; see also United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d
638, 640 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The only potentially effective remedy when a defendant breaks a promise
not to appeal is to allow the prosecutor to withdraw some concessions.”).
168. Nunez, 546 F.3d at 455 (“[A] defendant has more reason to protest if a lawyer files an
appeal that jeopardizes the benefit of the bargain than to protest if the lawyer does nothing—for
‘nothing’ is at least harmless.”). Cf. United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2005) (“It may be very foolish to risk losing a seven-year plea bargain on an appeal almost
sure to go nowhere . . . . [n]evertheless the client has the constitutional right . . . .”).
169. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000).
170. See id. at 480 (discussing the relevance of a defendant’s guilty plea in the Court’s analysis
of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
171. See id. at 485 (“Like the decision whether to appeal, the decision whether to plead guilty
(i.e., waive trial) rested with the defendant and, like this case, counsel’s advice . . . might have
caused the defendant to forfeit a judicial proceeding which he was otherwise entitled.”).
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The Mabry court briefly discussed counsel’s duty to protect the benefits of his
client’s plea, but the court focused its discussion on the constitutionality of
appellate waivers.172 The court stated that the waiver of appellate rights
foreclosed the ability to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.173 The
only way the defendant could bring such a claim, in the Third Circuit’s opinion,
would be to challenge the waiver.174 This challenge would require an analysis
of whether the plea was entered into “knowing[ly] and voluntary[ily],” and
whether enforcing the waiver would constitute a “miscarriage of justice.”175 The
Mabry court further supported its position by recognizing that “both [the Third
Circuit]” and “the Supreme Court have upheld the validity of waivers of rights
to appeal.”176
While the Third Circuit cleverly skirted around the ineffective assistance issue
with some rational arguments, it ignored the actual claim presented.177 The fact
that the waiver is constitutional is not dispositive of whether counsel’s
performance met constitutional requirements.178 It is also important to
distinguish this case from Campbell, Garrett, and even Nunez. The waiver
Mabry accepted “waived any right to appeal any conviction and sentence.”179
Mabry also waived his right “to challenge any conviction or sentence or the

172. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240–42 (3d Cir. 2008) (deciding that the Third
Circuit will “consider the validity of the collateral waiver as a threshold issue . . . [and] whether
enforcing the waiver . . . would work a miscarriage of justice”).
173. See id. at 241 (“While a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief if his attorney
ineffectively fails to file a requested appeal because it is presumed to be prejudicial under FloresOrtega, if the same defendant has effectively waived his right to habeas, he cannot even bring such
a claim . . . .”).
174. See id. at 241–42 (stating that the key determination is the waiver’s validity).
175. See id. at 241 (explaining the test the courts use to decide if an appellate waiver “pass[es]
muster”).
176. Id. at 242. In addition, the Third Circuit believed that “the right to appeal that has been
waived stands on a different footing from a preserved right to appeal, both conceptually and in
relation to counsel’s duty to his client.” Id.
177. Id. at 233 (reasoning that the real issue was the validity of the waiver and “giving effect
to the waiver,” as opposed to addressing the ineffective counsel issue).
178. See Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven though a
defendant is clearly entitled to waive the right to an appeal by executing a plea agreement, even the
broadest waiver does not absolutely foreclose some degree of appellate review. To the contrary,
our cases have repeatedly recognized that a waiver can be challenged . . . [if it] ‘was the product of
ineffective assistance of counsel.’” (quoting United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir.
2012)).
179. Mabry, 536 F.3d at 233 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that
the waiver included appeals against “a sentence imposed within the mandatory minimum, on any
and all grounds set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3742] or any other grounds, constitutional or
nonconstitutional [sic]”). During the trial, the court asked Mabry if he understood that “unless there
is an error that results in a miscarriage of justice, [Mabry] will have no right to challenge or appeal
an incorrect or allegedly incorrect determination of the advisory sentencing guidelines
imprisonment range made by the [c]ourt . . . . The defendant answered both questions
affirmatively.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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manner in which the sentence was determined in any collateral proceeding.”180
However, the defendants in Campbell, Garrett, and Nunez were provided with
some exceptions in their respective plea agreements.181 While this factual
difference may justify the result the Third Circuit reached in Mabry, it is also
essential to distinguish Mabry as an outlier case.
III. DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED FOR THE SAKE OF
JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
The majority approach is based on strong constitutional arguments and the
recognition that it is important to protect the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees.182
Moreover, it is in accord with recent Supreme Court decisions.183 In Lafler and
Cooper, for example, the Court indicated a willingness to extend the bounds of
the Strickland test’s protections, and the majority approach does exactly that—
it broadens Strickland’s applicability.184 The Sixth Amendment also supports
this approach.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the
assistance of counsel.185 Defense counsel “is essential to ensure a fair trial.”186
ABA standards, which the Supreme Court frequently consults in ineffective
assistance of counsel cases, state that “[t]he basic duty defense counsel owes . .
. is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and
devotion,”187 and advise the accused.188 When defense counsel ignores the direct
180. Id. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted). For a more detailed explanation of the plea
bargain and appellate waiver, see id. at 234–35. Mabry signed a letter acknowledging that he
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the plea bargain. Id. at 233.
181. Campbell, 686 F.3d at 355 n.1 (waiving all appellate rights with the exception of
challenges that the punishment that exceeds the statutory maximum, “claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel,” voluntariness of the plea, or “prosecutorial misconduct”); Nunez v. United
States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (retaining the right to appeal if the sentence “exceeded
the statutory maximum or the waiver clause itself should be deemed invalid”); United States v.
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (providing Garrett the opportunity to appeal if
the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or if any Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court case
changes a law retroactively that applies to Garrett).
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. See Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic
and Strickland in Light of Padilla, Frye, and Lafler, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 229, 238 (2012) (“Taken
together, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler demonstrate that the Court is endorsing a new set of inquiries
into counsel’s actions, which opens up the range of cases in which ineffective assistance cases may
be successful.”).
184. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1216–17 (2012) (concluding that Lafler and Frye “provide authority for a
broad construction of the right to effective assistance, such that the right is increasingly regarded
as valuable for its own sake, and not merely as an adjunct to the fair trial right”).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
186. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 851 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF.
FUNCTION 4-1.2, at 120 (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
188. See id. 4-5.1, at 197.
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orders of his client, not only does he fail to be a zealous advocate for the
defendant, but he also goes beyond the role of advisor to that of decision-maker.
Although the Court gives deference to counsel and their “strategic”
decisions,189 the ultimate determination of whether “to appeal rests with the
defendant,” not counsel.190 The defendant has the power to waive a jury trial,191
to waive the right to the assistance of counsel,192 and to waive the right to a trial
by accepting a plea bargain.193 Even if a defendant has waived his right to
appeal, it would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent to allow counsel to
make the ultimate decision and refuse to file an appeal that the defendant wants
to file.194 Just as the defendant is the one who must ultimately suffer the
consequences that may arise from breaching his plea agreement, the defendant
also bears the risks of not filing an appeal, and, therefore, the defendant is the
one who should have the power to take that risk.195
Despite this legally sound and constitutionally supported reasoning, the
approach has been criticized as encouraging lawyers to file frivolous appeals.196
Such an argument presumes that all appeals filed with an appellate waiver in
189. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–91 (1984) (“[T]he defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound
trial strategy.’” (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
190. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“It is . . . recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority
to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a
jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”).
191. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279–80 (1942) (discussing the
right of the defendant to determine whether to waive the right to a jury trial and stating that “[t]o
deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as capable
as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair the worth of great Constitutional
safeguards by treating them as empty verbalisms”).
192. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (recognizing a defendant’s right to
waive the assistance of counsel and that “although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law’” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring))).
193. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (stating that a plea agreement
waives the “right to a trial by jury, and . . . to confront [the] accusers”).
194. See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
195. See United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating
that, despite the potential risks of filing an appeal with an appellate waiver in place, defendants
have the right “to bet on the possibility of winning the appeal and then winning an acquittal, just as
a poker player has the right to hold the ten and queen of hearts, discard three aces, and pray that
when he draws three cards, he gets a royal flush”); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEF. FUNCTION 4-5.2, at 199–200 (3d ed. 1993) (“Certain
decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately
for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with
counsel include: (i) what pleas to enter; (ii) whether to accept a plea agreement; (iii) whether to
waive jury trial; (iv) whether to testify in his or her own behalf; and (v) whether to appeal.”).
196. See Kaplan-Marans, supra note 10, at 1204–05 (discussing the decrease in judicial
efficiency that the majority approach creates).
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place are without merit. The fact that some appellate waivers contain exceptions
supports the proposition that there are non-frivolous grounds upon which a
defendant may file an appeal after waiving that right.197 Further, the Supreme
Court has recognized that:
although showing nonfrivilous grounds for appeal may give weight to
the contention that the defendant would have appealed, a defendant’s
inability to “specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal
reinstated,” will not foreclose the possibility that he can satisfy the
prejudice requirement where there are other substantial reasons to
believe that he would have appealed.198
The term “other substantial reasons” requires a showing that, but-for counsel’s
failure to file an appeal, the defendant would have appealed.199 Thus, the
presumption that all appeals filed after a defendant waived his right to appeal
are frivolous is an argument unsupported by both the Supreme Court’s reasoning
and the form of the waivers.200
Similar to the frivolous lawsuits concern is the argument that the majority
approach decreases judicial efficiency.201 Judicial efficiency, however, should
not be achieved at the expense of criminal defendants. Courts frequently take
actions that decrease judicial efficiency to protect defendants’ rights, such as
suppressing coerced confessions, even if the trial would proceed more efficiently
with the confession in evidence.202 Further, seized evidence that is crucial to a
case may be suppressed if obtained “in violation of the Constitution.”203 These
actions are taken because of the firmly rooted notion that “[n]othing [will]
destroy a government more quickly than . . . its disregard of the charter of its
own existence.”204 The United States’ criminal justice system is built on
fundamental rights, not judicial efficiency.205 If efficiency were the system’s
main concern, the Bill of Rights would become superfluous.

197. See supra note 178.
198. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 486 (2000) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 486.
200. See supra Section I.B.2; supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
201. Gregory P. LaVoy, Neither a “Moose” Nor a “Puppet”: Defining Lawyer’s Role When
Directed to Pursue an Appeal Notwithstanding a Valid Waiver of Appellate Rights, 7 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 265, 306 (2008) (“[T]he majority rule developed throughout the federal circuits relies on
that which is familiar . . . . And it does so with various social costs to . . . judicial efficiency . . .
.”).
202. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 479 (1966) (stating that an “essential
mainstay of our adversarial system” consists of protection from being compelled to self incriminate,
and that if a party is not warned of his Fifth Amendment rights, “no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him”).
203. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
204. Id. at 659.
205. See Kaplan-Marans, supra note 10, at 1206 (recognizing that “maximizing judicial
efficiency should not trump a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process . . . by denying
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The majority approach fails to provide an efficient process for separating
defendants who have valid grounds for appeal from those who do not.206 The
Supreme Court has recognized the need for processes that protect the rights of a
defendant without creating an unnecessary burden on the judicial system.207 The
three-pronged test examined in Garrett is the kind of test that courts should
adopt because it allows them to quickly analyze and dismiss cases that lack
merit.208 This process in turn allows efficiency while still prioritizing the
defendant’s rights.209 The test requires the court to analyze: “(1) whether the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of defendant’s waiver of appellate rights;
(2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights;
and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.”210
Implementing this test would allow a defendant to have a hearing that would
vindicate his desire for an appeal and determine whether he has a valid appeal
before adjudicating the merits.211 For defense counsel, it provides a simple way
to file a notice of appeal, which could quickly be dismissed if it is without merit,
thereby avoiding a potential claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV: CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Accordingly, defense attorneys are integral to our judicial
system, and play a significant role in the appellate system. Under the appellate
system, a defendant can challenge a conviction by filing a notice of appeal, and
the judiciary can “check” itself to verify that the defendant has been provided all
his constitutionally guaranteed rights. When defense counsel fails to file such
an appeal, even if the defendant has waived his right to appeal in a plea bargain,
counsel’s failure robs a defendant of this crucial proceeding. While defense
counsel may have a valid argument for “protecting the benefits” a defendant
received from a plea bargain, a defendant has the right to make the ultimate
decision to risk those benefits by filing an appeal. It is not a defense attorney’s
place to choose what risks a defendant is willing to take. While it may strain an
defendants the opportunity to appeal” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., Maxy v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 569 F. Supp. 2d 720, 722 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (explaining that, in certain cases in which a
defendant requests issue bifurcation, “the potential prejudice to the defendant outweighed any
decrease in judicial economy or efficiency”).
206. See supra Part II.A; see also supra note 140 and accompanying text (establishing a test
that could increase efficiency without sacrificing fundamental rights).
207. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (“[I]f counsel finds his case to be
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.”).
208. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
application of the test allows for a “summary and efficient dismissal of a waived appeal”).
209. See id. (discussing the benefits of the appellate waiver test).
210. Id. (citing United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004)).
211. See Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1266 (discussing the relevance of the appellate waiver test within
the defendant’s appeals process).
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already over-burdened system, holding that defense counsel has provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when failing to follow orders from his client to
file an appeal, even if his client has waived that right, is the best way to protect
defendants’ rights and ability to make decisions regarding their own criminal
proceedings and sentences. This approach may create risks for defendants, but,
ultimately, it will protect the guarantee of effective counsel that is at the heart of
the Sixth Amendment.
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